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Abstract: We develop a general framework to analyze endogenous relationships.
To consider relationships in the modern society, neither one-shot games nor repeated
games are appropriate models because the formation and dissolution of a relationship
is not an option. We formulate voluntarily separable repeated games, in which
players are randomly matched to play a component game as well as to choose whether
to play the game again with the same partner. There is no information ﬂow across
matches, and players are boundedly rational. We extend the notion of Neutrally
Stable Distribution (NSD) to ﬁt for our model. When the component game is
a prisoner’s dilemma, NSD requires some trust-building periods to defect at the
beginning of a partnership. We ﬁnd that polymorphic NSDs with voluntary break-
ups include strategies with shorter trust-building periods than any monomorphic
NSD with no voluntary separation, and hence the average payoﬀ of polymorphic
NSD is higher.
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We develop a general framework to analyze endogenous relationships. To con-
sider relationships in the modern society, neither one-shot games nor repeated games
are appropriate models because the formation and dissolution of a relationship is
not an option. We formulate voluntarily separable repeated games in a large society
of homogeneous players. Players are randomly matched to play a stage game, and,
after each round of play, they can choose whether to continue playing the game
with the same partner or not. Each direct interaction (a partnership) is voluntarily
separable, and, moreover, there is no information ﬂow to other partnerships.
We focus on two-person prisoner’s dilemma as the component game, since it
highlights the merit of mutual cooperation as well as a strong incentive to defect
and escape to avoid retaliation. There are many real-world situations which ﬁt this
model. Borrowers can move from a city to another after defaulting. Workers can
shirk and then quit the job. Still, we often observe cooperative modes of behavior
in such situations. We provide an evolutionary foundation to cooperative behaviors.
We consider boundedly rational players who are endowed with a pure strategy
and analyze evolutionary stability of strategy distributions. Since our model is
an extensive form game, there are many strategies that only diﬀer in the oﬀ-path
decision nodes. Hence invasion concept needs to be carefully deﬁned. We extend
Neutrally Stable Distribution (NSD) concept, under which no other strategy earns
strictly higher payoﬀ than the incumbents do.
Known disciplining strategies such as trigger strategies (Fudenberg and Maskin,
1986) and contagion of defection (Kandori, 1992, and Ellison, 1994) do not sustain
cooperation in our model. There are two reasons. First, personalized punishment
is impossible due to the ability to end the partnership unilaterally and the lack
of information ﬂow to the future partners. Second, the large society and random
death make it impossible to spread defection in the society to eventually reach the
original deviator. Our model describes a large, anonymous, and member-changing
society, which needs a diﬀerent type of discipline from those of a society of directly
interacting long-run players.
1Some literature exists on voluntarily separable repeated games for generalized
prisoner’s dilemma (Datta, 1996, Kranton 1996a, and Ghosh and Ray, 1997). They
focused on symmetric strategy distributions in which all (rational) players play the
same strategy and showed that a gradual-cooperation strategy sustains eventual
cooperation. By contrast, our framework is valid for any component game, and we
consider both symmetric (called monomorphic) strategy distributions, in which no
voluntary separation occurs, and fundamentally asymmetric (polymorphic) strategy
distributions, in which voluntary separation occurs on the equilibrium play path.
We ﬁrst show that Defect must be played initially to sustain future cooperation.
We then identify a relationship between the death rate (discount factor) and the suﬃ-
cient number of initial defection (called trust-building periods) of both monomorphic
NSDs and polymorphic NSDs. We found that polymorphic NSDs include strategies
with shorter trust-building periods than monomorphic NSDs, thanks to double dis-
ciplining by not only trust building but also possible exploitation by a strategy with
longer trust-building periods. Hence polymorphic NSDs are more eﬃcient than the
most eﬃcient monomorphic NSD.
The existence of polymorphic NSDs in a homogeneous population provides an
evolutionary foundation to incomplete information models of voluntarily separable
repeated games (e.g., Ghosh and Ray, 1997, and Rob and Yang, 2005). Diverse
strategies co-exist, discipline each other, and the shortest trust-building strategy
can survive thanks to eﬃcient outcome when meeting the same-type partner.
Extensions include cheap-talk model and other types of strategy distributions
and component games. The trust-building periods can be viewed as a signal to
distinguish cooperative strategies from others. Then it is natural to extend the
model to allow cheap-talk. When cheap-talk is introduced at the beginning of a new
partnership, the most eﬃcient symmetric NSD is the unique symmetric NSD that
cannot be invaded by equilibrium entrants (Swinkels, 1992). We also mention how
coordinated action proﬁles over time (such as alternating (C,D) and (D,C)) can be
sustained. This leads to the analysis of asymmetric stage games such as Hawk-Dove.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the formal model
2and stability concepts. In Section 3, we identify the shortest trust-building periods
for monomorphic NSDs. In Section 4, we identify shortest trust-building periods
for various polymorphic NSDs. In Section 5 we discuss extensions including the
cheap-talk model and give concluding remarks.
2. MODEL AND STABILITY CONCEPTS
2.1. Model
Consider a society with a continuum of players, each of whom may die in each
period 1,2,... with probability 0 < (1 − δ) < 1. When they die, they are replaced
by newly born players, keeping the total population constant. A newly born player
enters into the matching pool where players are randomly paired to play a Voluntarily
Separable Prisoner’s Dilemma (VSPD) as follows.1
In each period, players play the following Extended Prisoners’ Dilemma (EPD).
First, they play ordinary one-shot prisoners’ dilemma, whose actions are denoted
as Cooperate and Defect. After observing the play action proﬁle of the period by
the two players, they choose simultaneously whether or not they want to keep the
match into the next period (action k) or bring it to an end (action e). Unless both
choose k, the match is dissolved and players will have to start the next period in
the matching pool. In addition, even if they both choose k, partner may die with
probability 1−δ which forces the player to go back to the matching pool next period.
If both choose k and survive to the next period, then the match continues, and the
matched players play EPD again.
Assume that there is limited information available to play EPD. In each period,
players know the VSPD history of their current match but have no knowledge about
the history of other matches in the society.
In each match, a proﬁle of play actions determines the players’ instantaneous
payoﬀs for each period while they are matched. We denote the payoﬀs associated
ɹ
1Although we focus on Prisoner’s Dilemma as the component game, the framework can be
applied to any component game.
3TABLE I
PAYOFF OF PD
P1 \ P2 C D
C c, c `, g
D g, ` d, d
with each play action proﬁle as: u(C,C) = c, u(C,D) = `, u(D,C) = g, u(D,D) = d
with the ordering2 g > c > d > ` and 2c ≥ g + `. (See Table I.)
Because we assume that the innate discount rate is zero except for the possibility
of death, each player ﬁnds the relevant discount factor to be δ ∈ (0,1). With this,
life-long payoﬀ for each player is well-deﬁned given his own strategy (for VSPD) and
the strategy distribution in the matching pool population over time.
Let t = 1,2,... indicate the periods in a match, not the calendar time in the
game. Under the limited information assumption, without loss of generality we
can focus on strategies that only depend on t and the private history of actions
in the Prisoner’s Dilemma within a match.3 Let Ht := {C,D}2(t−1) be the set of
partnership histories at the beginning of t ≥ 2 and let H1 := {∅}.
DEFINITION. A pure strategy s of VSPD speciﬁes (xt,yt)∞
t=1 where:
xt : Ht → {C,D} speciﬁes an action choice xt(ht) ∈ {C,D} given the partnership
history ht ∈ Ht, and
yt : Ht×{C,D}2 → {k,e} speciﬁes whether to keep or end the partnership, depend-
ing upon the partnership history ht ∈ Ht and the current period action proﬁle.
The set of pure strategies of VSPD is denoted as S and the set of all strategy
distributions in the population is denoted as P(S). For simplicity we assume that
each player uses a pure strategy.
We investigate stability of stationary strategy distributions in the matching pool.
Although the strategy distribution in the matching pool may be diﬀerent from the
2We make a remark on the case of 2c < g + ` in the concluding remark.
3The continuation decision is observable, but strategies cannot vary depending on combinations
of {k,e} since only (k,k) will lead to the future choice of actions.
4distribution in the entire society, if the former is stationary, the distribution of vari-
ous states of matches (strategy pair and the “age” of the partnership) is also station-
ary, thanks to the stationary death process. Hence stability of stationary strategy
distributions in the matching pool implies stability of “social states”. Moreover, by
looking at the strategy distributions in the matching pool, we can directly compute
life-time payoﬀs of players easily.
2.2. Life-time and Average Payoﬀ in a Match
When a strategy s ∈ S is matched with another strategy s0 ∈ S, the expected
length of the match is denoted as L(s,s0) and is computed as follows. Notice that
even if s and s0 intend to maintain the match, it will only continue with probability
δ2, which is the probability that both survive to the next period. Suppose that if
no death occurs while they form the partnership, s and s0 will end the partnership
at the end of T(s,s0)-th period of the match. Then
L(s,s
0) := 1 + δ
2 + δ
4 + ··· + δ
2{T(s,s0)−1} =
1 − δ2T(s,s0)
1 − δ2 .
The expected total discounted value of the payoﬀ stream of s within the match
with s0 is denoted as V I(s,s0). The average per period payoﬀ that s expects to receive












2.3. Life-time and Average Payoﬀ in the Matching Pool
Next we show the structure of the life-time and average payoﬀ of a player endowed
with strategy s ∈ S in the matching pool, waiting to be matched randomly with
a partner. When a strategy distribution in the matching pool is p ∈ P(S) and is
stationary, we write the expected total discounted value of payoﬀ streams s expects
to receive during his lifetime as V (s;p) and the average per period payoﬀ s expects




= (1 − δ)V (s;p),
5where L = 1 + δ + δ2 + ··· = 1
1−δ is the number of total days s expects to live.
A straightforward way to compute V (s;p) is to set up a recursive equation. If p
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where supp(p) is the support of the distribution p, T(s,s0) is the date at the end
of which s and s0 end the match, the sum δ(1 − δ){1 + δ2 + ··· + δ2{T(s,s0)−2}} is
the probability that s loses the partner s0 before T(s,s0), and δ2{T(s,s0)−1}δ is the
probability that the match continued until T(s,s0) and s survives at the end of
T(s,s0) and goes back to the matching pool.
Let L(s;p) :=
P





































where the ratio L(s,s0)/L(s;p) is the relative length of periods that s expects to
spend in a match with s0. In particular, if p is a strategy distribution consisting of
a single strategy s0, then v(s;p) = vI(s,s0).
2.4. Nash Equilibrium
DEFINITION. Given a stationary strategy distribution in the matching pool p ∈
P(S), s ∈ S is a best reply against p if for all s0 ∈ S,
v(s;p) ≥ v(s
0;p),
4However, this means that, in general, v(s;p) 6=
P
s0 p(s0)vI(s,s0). That is, v is not linear in
the second component. This is due to the recursive structure of the V function.
6and is denoted as s ∈ BR(p).
DEFINITION. A stationary strategy distribution in the matching pool p ∈ P(S) is a
Nash equilibrium if, for all s ∈ supp(p), s ∈ BR(p).
LEMMA 1. For any pure strategy s ∈ S that starts with C in t = 1, let ps be the
strategy distribution consisting only of s. Then ps is not a Nash equilibrium.
PROOF: Consider a myopic strategy ˜ d which plays D at t = 1 and ends the part-
nership for any observation at t = 1. For t ≥ 2, which is oﬀ-path, specify arbitrary
actions. Then any ˜ d-strategy earns g as the average payoﬀ under ps, which is the
maximal possible payoﬀ. I.e., ˜ d ∈ BR(ps) and s 6∈ BR(ps). Q.E.D.
Therefore, trigger strategy used in the ordinary folk theorem of repeated pris-
oner’s dilemma cannot constitute even a Nash equilibrium. There needs to be at
least one period of (D,D) in any symmetric equilibrium.
By contrast, p˜ d consisting only of a ˜ d-strategy is a Nash equilibrium. Against a ˜ d-
strategy, any strategy must play one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma. Hence, any strategy
that starts with C in t = 1 earns strictly lower average payoﬀ than that of a ˜ d-
strategy, and any strategy that starts with D in t = 1 earns the same average payoﬀ
as that of a ˜ d-strategy.
2.5. Neutral Stability
Recall that in an ordinary 2-person symmetric normal-form game G = (S,u), a
(mixed) strategy p ∈ P(S) is a Neutrally Stable Strategy if for any q ∈ P(S), there
exists 0 < ¯ ²q < 1 such that for any ² ∈ (0,¯ ²q), Eu(p,(1 − ²)p + ²q) ≥ Eu(q,(1 −
²)p + ²q). (Maynard Smith, 1982.)
An extension of this concept to our extensive form game is to require a strategy
distribution not to be invaded by a small fraction of a mutant strategy who enters
the matching pool in a stationary manner.
7DEFINITION. Given ² > 0 and a stationary strategy distribution p ∈ P(S) in the
matching pool, a strategy s0 ∈ S invades p for ² if for any s ∈ supp(p),
v(s
0;(1 − ²)p + ²ps0) ≥ v(s;(1 − ²)p + ²ps0), (2)
and for some s ∈ supp(p),
v(s
0;(1 − ²)p + ²ps0) > v(s;(1 − ²)p + ²ps0), (3)
where ps0 is the strategy distribution consisting only of s0.
A weaker notion of invasion that requires weak inequality only (which is used
in the notion of Evolutionary Stable Strategy) is too weak in our extensive-form
model since any strategy that is diﬀerent in the oﬀ-path actions from the incumbent
strategies can invade under the weak inequality condition.
DEFINITION. A stationary strategy distribution p ∈ P(S) in the matching pool is
a Neutrally Stable Distribution (NSD) if, for any s0 ∈ S, there exists ¯ ² ∈ (0,1) such
that s0 cannot invade p for any ² ∈ (0,¯ ²).
If a symmetric strategy distribution consisting of a single pure strategy s is a
neutrally stable distribution, then s is called a Neutrally Stable Strategy (NSS). The
condition for s to be a NSS reduces to: for any s0 ∈ S, there exists ¯ ² ∈ (0,1) such
that, for any ² ∈ (0,¯ ²),
v(s;(1 − ²)ps + ²ps0) ≥ v(s
0;(1 − ²)ps + ²ps0).
It can be easily seen that any NSD is a Nash equilibrium.
Similar to the “static” notion of evolutionary stability, this deﬁnition is based on
the assumption that mutation takes place rarely so that only single mutation occurs
within the time span in which stationary strategy distribution is formed. However,
unlike the ordinary notion of neutral stability (or ESS) of one-shot games, we need
to assume the expected length of the life-time of a mutant strategy in order to
calculate the average payoﬀ. We adopted a strong requirement that the incumbents
8are not worse-oﬀ than mutants even if mutants stay stationarily in the population,
let alone if they die out. While we do not insist that the above deﬁnition is the best
among we can imagine, it is tractable and justiﬁable.
We show that any ˜ d-strategy is not NSS, even though it constitutes a symmetric
Nash equilibrium. Hence NSD concept selects among Nash equilibria in our model.
LEMMA 2. Any myopic ˜ d-strategy is not an NSS.
PROOF: Consider the following c1-strategy.
t = 1: Play D and keep the partnership if and only if (D,D) is observed in the
current period.
t ≥ 2: Play C and keep the partnership if and only if (C,C) is observed in the
current period.
For any ² ∈ (0,1), let p := (1 − ²)p˜ d + ²p1. From (1),
v(˜ d;p) = d;









since vI(c1, ˜ d) = d, and vI(c1,c1) = (1 − δ2)d + δ2c > d. Q.E.D.
2.6. Simple, Trust-building Strategies
We will analyze equilibria of a certain form called trust-building strategies. Our
purpose of this paper is not to provide a folk theorem but to clarify how repeated
cooperation can be played by boundedly rational players in an anonymous society
who do not play carefully constructed punishment strategies. Needless to say, Nash
equilibrium and NSD are proved by checking all other strategies in S (not just
among trust-building strategies).
Intuitively, we focus on generalized versions of c1-strategy that can invade the
population of a myopic ˜ d-strategy. To formalize, we ﬁrst deﬁne simple strategies,
which have a set of acceptable paths and end a partnership as soon as a deviation
from acceptable paths is observed. Simple strategies, however, do not restrict the
9equilibrium outcomes because the equilibrium continuation payoﬀs cannot be lower
than the continuation payoﬀ after voluntary separation.
Let Ω = ∪∞
t=1({C,D} × {C,D,∅})(t−1). Interpret that the ﬁrst coordinate is the
player’s own action and the second coordinate is the current partner’s “acceptable”
action. The ∅ means that any action by the partner is not acceptable, i.e., the
strategy intends to end the partnership regardless of the observation at that point.
For any q ∈ Ω, let |q| be the length of the sequence q, i.e., the number of action
proﬁles contained in q.
DEFINITION. Q ⊂ Ω is the set of acceptable paths if,
(1) for any q,q0 ∈ Q and any t = 1,2,...,min{|q|,|q0|}, if (q(1),...,q(t − 1)) =
(q0(1),...,q0(t − 1)), then q1(t) = q0
1(t);
(2) for any q ∈ Q, if q2(t) = ∅ for some t, then |q| = t.
The ﬁrst condition guarantees that the action is uniquely determined after any
acceptable observed path. The second condition means that if a strategy intends to
end the partnership at t, then the speciﬁcation of the acceptable path ends there.
DEFINITION. For any set of acceptable paths Q ⊂ Ω, a strategy s(Q) ∈ S is a simple
strategy if, in each period t,
(a) in the stage game, it plays according to the unique q1(t) generated by Q and the
observed path; and
(b) in the continuation decision phase, it keeps the partnership if and only if the
observed path is the same as the ﬁrst t components of some q ∈ Q.
An extension of the ordinary C-trigger strategy to our model is a simple strategy
with a singleton set of acceptable path
Qtr = {((C,C),(C,C),...)}.
Any myopic ˜ d-strategy is also a simple strategy with Q˜ d = {((D,∅))}.
Next, we deﬁne trust-building strategies, a generalization of c1-strategy.
10DEFINITION. For any T = 1,2,3,..., let a trust-building strategy with T periods
of trust-building (written as cT-strategy hereafter) be a simple strategy with the
singleton set of acceptable path
QcT = {(
T times z }| {
(D,D),...,(D,D),(C,C),(C,C),...)}.
The ﬁrst T periods of cT-strategy are called trust-building periods and the periods
afterwards are called the cooperation periods. This class of simple strategies are of
particular interest, since if matched players use the same cT-strategy, the cooperation
periods give the most eﬃcient symmetric outcome as long as they live. However, in
order to sustain the perpetual cooperation, we need at least one period of (D,D)
due to Lemma 1. We are interested in the shortest trust-building periods to sustain
such a cooperative long-term relationship.
3. MONOMORPHIC STRATEGY DISTRIBUTIONS
We ﬁrst consider monomorphic strategy distributions, consisting of a single cT-
strategy. The literature of voluntarily separable repeated games has focused on
similar symmetric strategy distributions.
Let pT be the strategy distribution consisting only of cT-strategy. The average
payoﬀ of cT-strategy when pT is the stationary strategy distribution in the matching
pool is computed as follows. A match of cT against cT continues as long as they
both live and the payoﬀ sequence is d for the ﬁrst T periods and c thereafter:
L(cT,cT) = 1 + δ




I(cT,cT) = {1 + δ
2 + ··· + δ
2(T−1)}d + (δ
2T + ···)c.
Since v(cT;pT) = vI(cT,cT) =
V I(cT,cT)
L(cT,cT) , the average payoﬀ is
v(cT;pT) = (1 − δ
2T)d + δ
2Tc. (4)
By the logic of dynamic programming, it is necessary and suﬃcient for a strategy
to be optimal that it cannot be improved by one-step deviations. Although the
11literal one-step deviations are infeasible in our model (since a player cannot change
strategies across matches), it is easy to see that if a strategy is unimprovable by
(infeasible) one-step deviations, then it is unimprovable by any strategy within S.
Therefore we ﬁnd a condition that strategies which diﬀer from cT in one-step (in
particular during the cooperation periods) do not give a higher average payoﬀ than
cT-strategy when the stationary strategy distribution in the matching pool is pT.
Suppose that one plays D at some point during the cooperation periods. The
player receives g but returns to the matching pool if he does not die. The con-
tinuation payoﬀ is thus g + δV (cT;pT). By contrast, the expected continuation
payoﬀ of cT-strategy during the cooperation periods is L(cT,cT)c + δ(1 − δ)(1 +
δ2 + ···)V (cT;pT) = L(cT,cT)c + δ(1 − δ)L(cT,cT)V (cT;pT). Therefore, one-step
deviation during cooperation periods is not better than cT-strategy if and only if
g + δV (cT;pT) ≤ L(cT,cT)c + δ(1 − δ)L(cT,cT)V (cT;pT),
⇐⇒ v(cT;pT) ≤
1
δ2[c − (1 − δ
2)g] =: v
BR, (5)
which we call the Best Reply Condition. Since vBR is independent of the length T
of trust-building periods and v(cT;pT) decreases as T increases, (5) implies a lower
bound to T.
Now we prove that in fact the Best Reply Condition (5) is the only condition
that is required for pT to be a Nash equilibrium. Let on-path history at a decision
node of t = 1,2,3,..., be the play path until the decision node of the t-th period in
a match of two cT-strategies. That is, the on-path history in PD in periods t ≤ T is
(D,D)t−1 and in periods t ≥ T +1 is {(D,D)T,(C,C)(t−T−1)}. The on-path history
at the continuation decision phase is similarly deﬁned.
LEMMA 3. Take an arbitrary T = 1,2,3,.... Let pT be the stationary strategy dis-
tribution in the matching pool, consisting only of cT-strategy.
(a) Any strategy that ends the match in some period t = 1,2,... along on-path
history is not a best reply against pT.
12(b) Any strategy that chooses C at some t < T + 1 along on-path history is not a
best reply against pT.
(c) Let s be any strategy that chooses D at some t ≥ T +1 along on-path history.
Then v(cT;pT) ≥ v(s;pT) if and only if v(cT;pT) ≤ vBR.
PROOF: See Appendix.
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Although δ(1) may exceed 1, δ(∞) < 1. Hence for any δ > δ(∞), there exists
the minimum length of trust building periods that warrants (5):
τ(δ) := argminτ∈R++{δ(τ) | δ ≥ δ(τ)}.
It is easy to see that τ is a decreasing function of δ.
PROPOSITION 1. For any δ ∈ (δ(∞),1), the monomorphic strategy distribution pT
consisting only of cT-strategy is a Nash equilibrium if and only if T ≥ τ(δ).
PROOF: (Can be omitted.) Lemma 3 implies that no strategy which diﬀer on the
play path from cT-strategy is better oﬀ if and only if T is suﬃciently long so that
(5) holds, i.e., T ≥ τ(δ). Strategies that diﬀer from cT-strategy oﬀ the play path do
not give a higher payoﬀ. Q.E.D.
Note that the lower bound to the discount factor (as δ2) that sustains the trigger-




This means that cooperation in VSPD requires more patience.
13Next we investigate when a Nash equilibrium pT is neutrally stable. In general,
in order to check whether a Nash equilibrium distribution is a NSD, we only need
to consider mutants that are best replies to the Nash equilibrium distribution.
LEMMA 4. Suppose p ∈ P(S) is a Nash equilibrium. If a pure strategy s0 ∈ S invades
p for some ² > 0, then s0 is an alternatvie best reply to p, i.e., s0 ∈ BR(p).
PROOF: (Obvious from (1). Can be omitted.) See Appendix.
There are only two kinds of strategies that may become alternative best replies to
pT. The obvious ones are those that diﬀer from cT-strategy oﬀ the play path. These
will give the same payoﬀ as cT-strategy and therefore cannot invade pT. The other
kind is the strategies that play D at some point in the cooperation periods. When
T > τ(δ), however, Lemma 3 (c) implies that such strategies are not alternative
best reply. Therefore cT-strategy is NSS for this case.
When τ(δ) is an integer, the Nash equilibrium pτ(δ) has alternative best replies,
among which cτ(δ)+1 earns the highest payoﬀ when meeting itself. It suﬃces to check
if cτ(δ)+1-strategy cannot invade pτ(δ).
Below we ﬁrst show general properties of the average values of cT-strategy and
cT+1-strategy for any T when both of these are present in the matching pool. This is
useful in the later analysis as well. After that we show a condition that cτ(δ)-strategy
earns a higher payoﬀ when the fraction of cτ(δ)+1-strategy is suﬃciently small.
For any T, let p
T+1
T (α) = αpT +(1−α)pT+1 be a two-strategy distribution of cT
and cT+1.
LEMMA 5. For any δ ∈ (δ(∞),1) and any T = 0,1,2..., v(cT;p
T+1
T (α)) is strictly
increasing and concave function of α.
PROOF: (By diﬀerentiation. Can be omitted.) See Appendix.
LEMMA 6. For any δ ∈ (δ(∞),1) and any T = 0,1,2... such that T ≤ τ(δ),
v(cT+1;p
T+1
T (α)) is strictly increasing and convex function of α.
PROOF: (By diﬀerentiation. Can be omitted.) See Appendix.














FIGURE 1. – The value functions of cT-strategy and cT+1-strategy when T = τ(δ).
(Parameter values: g = 10,c = 6,d = 1,` = −1,δ = 2 √
5,T = τ(δ) = 1.)
The intuition of the concavity and convexity of the average payoﬀs of cT and
cT+1-strategy respectively is as follows. As α decreases from 1 towards 0, cT-strategy
gets exploited by cT+1-strategy more often and the exploitation accelerates as the
fraction of cT+1-strategy increases. Hence the average value of cT-strategy drops
more as α decreases. On the other hand, as α increases from 0 to 1, cT+1-strategy
beneﬁts more and more by the increased probability of meeting cT-strategy. Thus
the average value of cT+1-strategy increases more as α increases.
Thanks to the concavity and convexity, cT+1-strategy cannot invade pT if and
only if the slope of v(cT;p
T+1
T (α)) is strictly smaller than the slope of v(cT+1;p
T+1
T (α))
at α = 1, see Figure 1.
















if and only if
[1 − δ
2(T+1)](g − `) < c − d. (6)
15PROOF: (By computation. Can be omitted.) See Appendix.
Hence, if we deﬁne ˆ τ(δ) implicitly as the solution to
[1 − δ
2(T+1)](g − `) = c − d,
then cτ+1-strategy cannot invade pτ if and only if τ(δ) < ˆ τ(δ).
To interpret (6), notice that L(cT,cT) = 1+δ2 +··· and L(cT+1,cT) = 1+δ2 +
··· + δ2T. Hence the condition (6) is equivalent to
(g − `)L(cT+1,cT) < (c − d)L(cT,cT) (7)
at T = τ(δ). The RHS of (7) can be interpreted as the relative merit of cT-strategy
against cT+1-strategy (to start cooperating one period early when meeting itself)
and the LHS is the relative merit of cT+1-strategy when meeting cT-strategy.
As δ increases (when G is ﬁxed), T must increase to keep the equality (6). Thus
ˆ τ is an increasing function of δ and goes to ∞ as δ → 1.
LEMMA 8. There exists a unique δ∗ ∈ (δ(∞),1) that satisﬁes
δ R δ
∗ ⇐⇒ ˆ τ(δ) R τ(δ).
PROOF: (Can be omitted. See Figure 2.) Recall that τ(δ) is decreasing in δ. When







δ(∞), where the inequality obtains by computation. Hence when δ is close to δ(∞),
ˆ τ(δ) < τ(δ). Q.E.D.
In summary, most of the symmetric Nash equilibirum strategies are NSS except
at some boundary values.
PROPOSITION 2. (a) For any δ such that δ∗ < δ < 1, cT-strategy is NSS if and
only if T ≥ τ(δ).

















FIGURE 2. – Parametric summary of monomorphic NSS
4. POLYMORPHIC STRATEGY DISTRIBUTIONS
The literature on voluntarily separable repeated games has concentrated on
monomorphic equilibria so that no voluntary break-up occurs, except for sorting
out inherent defectors under incomplete information case. (See concluding remark
Section 5.5.) We now investigate equilibria consisting of cT-strategies with diﬀer-
ent length of trust-building periods, hence voluntary break-ups occur on the play
path. Recall that our model is of complete information and with homogeneous play-
ers. Therefore this section can be interpreted as an evolutionary foundation to the
incomplete information models of diverse types of behaviors.
4.1. Bimorphic Distribution
We investigate the shortest T for a two-strategy distribution (called bimorphic
distribution) of p
T+1
T (α) = αpT + (1 − α)pT+1 to be a NSD for some α ∈ (0,1).
For a bimorphic distribution to be a NSD, all strategies in the support must earn
the same average payoﬀ for some α ∈ (0,1). Moreover, if α increases, cT-strategy
should be worse than cT+1-strategy and vice versa. Then the strategy distribution
17cannot be invaded by strategies that have the same play path as cT or cT+1-strategy.
Therefore we need:
Payoﬀ Equalization: there exists α
T+1
T ∈ (0,1) and a neighborhood U of α
T+1
T such





T (α)) R v(cT;p
T+1
T (α)). (8)
To derive the Best Reply Condition, note that there are two kinds of one-step
deviations under a bimorphic distribution. First, a strategy can play D and keep
the partnership until the partner ends the match. This strategy earns the same
average payoﬀ as cT+k-strategy with k ≥ 2. Second, a strategy can imitate cT or
cT+1-strategy to enter cooperation periods (i.e., play C at least once at T + 1 or
T + 2) and then play D to earn g for sure. Both kinds of one-step deviation do not
earn higher average payoﬀ than the incumbent cT and cT+1-strategies if and only if
a similar condition to (5) holds.
LEMMA 9. Best Reply Condition: Any one-step deviation strategy from cT or cT+1-





T )) ≤ v
BR. (9)
PROOF: (By computation. Can be omitted.) See Appendix.




T )) = vBR may not warrant a
NSD but the interior case is suﬃcient.
Let us describe the intuition of the existence of a bimorphic NSD using Figure 3.
Clearly, there is no bimorphic NSD with the support {cτ(δ),cτ(δ)+1}. For T slightly
below τ(δ), the average value functions v(cT;p
T+1
T (α)) and v(cT+1;p
T+1
T (α)) intersect
at α < 1 and the value at the intersection is below vBR. The latter holds when the
slope of v(cT;p
T+1
T (1)) is smaller than the slope of v(cT+1;p
T+1
T (1)), that is, when
T < ˆ τ(δ), using a similar logic to Lemma 7.
























FIGURE 3. – The existence of a bimorphic NSD as T is slightly below τ(δ).
(Parameter values: g = 10,c = 6.1,d = 2.1,` = 2,δ = 0.96,T = 1,τ(δ) ≈ 1.06.)
In a bimorphic NSD, the shortest trust-building periods is shorter than any of
monomorphic NSD because earlier opportunity to deviate is oﬀset by the possible
exploitation by cT+1-strategy in the future match.
PROPOSITION 3. For any δ > δ∗, there exists τ2(δ) such that τ2(δ) < τ(δ), and,





T (δ)), where α
T+1
T (δ) ∈ (0,1).
PROOF: See Appendix.
Therefore, cooperation and exploitation can co-exist. The minimal trust-building
periods τ2(δ) warrants that the payoﬀ-equalizing α
T+1
T (δ) exists. Then one can prove
that the Best Reply Condition is satisﬁed for that α
T+1
T (δ). Unlike monomorphic
NSDs, however, we need δ to be suﬃciently large, i.e., δ > δ∗. To warrant an integer
T, we need to restrict G so that (τ2(δ),τ(δ)) contains an integer. Figure 3 is a





















FIGURE 4. – Bimorphic NSD.
4.2. Higher Eﬃciency of Bimorphic NSD
For a given δ > δ∗, the shortest trust-building periods in the support of a bimor-
phic NSD, if it exists, is at least one period less than any of monomorphic NSS. Let









Lemma 6 shows that v(cT+1;p
T+1
T (α)) is an increasing function of α, and thus
v(cT+1;p
T+1







T (δ) > 0. (See Figure 3.) Hence bimorphic NSDs, if they exist, are more
eﬃcient than any monomorphic NSS, thanks to earlier cooperation, even though
equilibrium break-up occurs.
4.3. Staggered Distribution: Finite Support
We can extend the analysis of the bimorphic NSDs for NSDs with a ﬁnite support
of the form {cT,cT+1,...,cT+K}, which we call a (K+1)-morphic distribution. First,
we derive trimorphic NSDs with the support of {cT,cT+1,cT+2} as a benchmark.
20Let p
T+2
T (α,β) = αpT +(1−α)βpT+1+(1−α)(1−β)pT+2 be a trimorphic distri-
bution. The Payoﬀ Equalization condition should be derived backwards. Given the
fraction α of cT-strategy, ﬁnd β∗(α) ∈ (0,1) such that there exists a neighborhood




T (α,β)) R v(cT+1;p
T+2
T (α,β)). (10)
The β∗(α) exists if and only if the quadratic equation of β,
{v(cT+1;p
T+2
T (α,β)) − v(cT+2;p
T+2
T (α,β))}
×{αL(cT+1,cT) + (1 − α)βL(cT+1,cT+1) + (1 − α)(1 − β)L(cT+1,cT+2)}
×{αL(cT+2,cT) + (1 − α)βL(cT+2,cT+1) + (1 − α)(1 − β)L(cT+2,cT+2)} = 0
has two solutions within (0,1). The larger one is β∗(α).
Then we ﬁnd α
T+2
T ∈ (0,1) (dependent on δ) and its neighborhood W such that
for any α ∈ W,
α R α
T+2






Note that the average payoﬀ of cT-strategy only depends on α, since cT+1 and cT+2
behave the same way against cT. The payoﬀ-equalizing α
T+2
T (δ) exists if and only if
the intersection exists between v(cT;p
T+2
T (α)) and v(cT+1;p
T+2
T (α,β∗(α))), both of
which are functions of α only. See Figure 5.
The Best Reply Condition is derived in the same way as before. Any cT+k-
strategy (k = 0,1,2) is optimal if and only if





1 − δ2 +
δ(1 − δ)








c − (1 − δ2)g
δ2 = v
BR. (12)
It can be shown that the average payoﬀ of cT+1 under a payoﬀ-equalizing trimor-
phic distribution (i.e., under (α,β∗(α))) intersects with vBR at α where it intersects
with vBR under a bimorphic distribution. Moreover, since there are exploiters for
cT+1-strategy (namely cT+2-strategy), the average value of cT+1-strategy is lower























FIGURE 5. – Existence of Polymorphic NSDs.
(Parameter values: g = 10,c = 6.1,d = 2.1,` = 2,δ = 0.96,T = 1,τ(δ) ≈ 1.06.)
under the trimorphic distribution than under the bimorphic distribution with the
same α. See Figure 5.
LEMMA 10. For any δ > δ∗ and any T < τ(δ), let α∗




T (α)) = v
BR.
Then, β∗(α∗









Hence if a bimorphic NSD p
T+1
T exists, then a trimorphic NSD exists. (But not
vice versa.)
PROPOSITION 4. For any δ > δ∗ there exists τ3(δ) < τ2(δ) and, for any T such that















T (α)) < vBR which satisﬁes (8), then there exists α such that
v(cT+1;p
T+2
T (α,β∗(α))) = v(cT;p
T+2
T (α)) < vBR which satisﬁes (11). Moreover, even
if T = τ2(δ) so that there is no bimorphic NSD, the payoﬀ-equalizing α
T+2
T exists
to warrant a trimorphic NSD. Therefore the lower bound to T for the existence of
a trimorphic NSD is lower than τ2(δ). Q.E.D.
In addition, the average payoﬀ of the trimorphic NSD is greater than that of the
bimorphic NSD, thanks to the increasing nature of v(cT;p
T+1
T (α)) in α. This means
that even if the shortest trust-building periods is the same between a bimorphic
NSD and a trimorphic NSD, more diversity gives higher eﬃciency. The intuition is
that with more variety of strategies (i.e., more exploiters) in the society, the strategy










be a (K+1)-morphic distribution. Deﬁne the Payoﬀ-Equalizing β∗
k’s (k = 1,2,...,K)
as follows. For notational simplicity, let us write a vector βk
1 = (β1,...,βk) for any
k = 1,2,...,K.
Given the fractions (α,β
K−1
1 ), deﬁne β∗
K(α,β
K−1
1 ) ∈ (0,1) that makes cT+K and















for any βK in some neighborhood of β∗
K(α,β
K−1















































FIGURE 6. – Finite Support Polymorphic NSDs.
for any βK−1 in some neighborhood of β∗
K−1(α,β
K−2




for all k = 1,2,...,K, ﬁnally ﬁnd α
T+K
T ∈ (0,1) (dependent on δ) such that
α R α
T+K







for any α in some neighborhood of α
T+K
T (δ). Note that the average payoﬀ of cT-
strategy only depends on α, since cT+1,...,cT+K behave the same way against cT,
and the average payoﬀ of cT+1-strategy only depends on α and β1.
The payoﬀ-equalizing α
T+K
T (δ) exists if and only if the intersection exists between
v(cT;p
T+K
T (α)) and v(cT+1;p
T+K
T (α,β∗
1(α))). The Best Reply Condition is derived in
the same way as before. Using the same logic as Lemma 10, a (K+1)-morphic NSD
exists if K-morphic NSD exists. See Figure 6. In particular, for T ∈ (τ2(δ),τ(δ)),
any K-morphic NSD exists for K = 2,3,....
4.4. Staggered Distribution: Inﬁnite Support
Finally we consider simple strategy distributions with the support {cT,cT+1,...},
i.e., inﬁnitely many variety of trust-building periods. We ﬁrst prove that if a strategy
distribution with the support {cT,cT+1,...} is to become a NSD, then the population
distribution of ct-strategies must be “geometric”.
24LEMMA 11. For any T < ∞, let p be a stationary strategy distribution with the
support {cT,cT+1,...}. If v(cT;p) = v(cT+k;p) for all k = 1,2,..., then there exists
α ∈ (0,1) such that the fraction of cT+k-strategy is of the form α(1 − α)k for each
k = 0,1,2,....
PROOF: See Appendix.
Denote the geometric distribution of {cT,cT+1,...} as p∞
T (α). If p∞
T (α) is the
stationary strategy distribution in the matching pool and if cT and cT+1 have the
same average payoﬀ, then all other strategies in the support have also the same
payoﬀ. The intuition is as follows. From the second period on, cT+1-strategy behaves
the same way as cT-strategy against itself (there are T remaining periods of trust-
building) and against longer trust-building strategies (it ends the partnership after
T periods). The conditional probabilities of meeting itself and longer trust-building
strategies are also the same as those of cT-strategy.
Similarly, from the second period on, cT+2-strategy behaves the same way as
cT+1-strategy against itself and against longer trust-building strategies. Therefore,
if cT and cT+1-strategy have the same average payoﬀ, all others have the same
average payoﬀ as well. (See Table II in the Appendix.)
LEMMA 12. For any T < ∞ and any α ∈ (0,1), if v(cT;p∞
T (α)) = v(cT+1;p∞
T (α)),
then v(cT+k;p∞
T (α)) = v(cT;p∞
T (α)) for all k = 1,2,....
PROOF: (Can be omitted.) See Appendix.
It is straightforward to show that v(cT+1;p∞
T (α)) < v(cT+1;p
T+1
T (α)) for any
α < αT+1(vBR) so that the payoﬀ-equalizing α exists if a bimorphic NSD exists.
The Best Reply Condition is derived as follows. Notice that for any period after
T, playing D (after repeating (D,D)) is an on-path action. Hence the meaningful
deviation strategies are those that play D after the cooperation periods started (that
is, play D and keep the partnership if and only if (D,D) is observed for ﬁrst T + k
periods, play C at least once, and then play D.) Using the continuation values at
25T +k+2, such one-step deviation during the cooperation periods is not better than
cT+k-strategy if and only if




1 − δ2 +
δ(1 − δ)






c − (1 − δ2)g
δ2 = v
BR. (15)
PROPOSITION 5. For any δ > δ∗ there exists τ∗(δ) < τ2(δ) and, for any T such that
τ∗(δ) < T < τ(δ), there is a NSD of the form p∞
T (α∗(δ)) for some α∗(δ) ∈ (0,1).
PROOF: (Similar to Proposition 4. Can be omitted.) See Appendix.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
5.1. Eﬃciency Wage and Three Types of Sanctions
Our model describes a society where players meet a stranger to play a voluntarily
separable prisoner’s dilemma. We analyzed how continuous cooperation becomes an
equilibrium behavior when deviation from cooperation induces appropriate social
sanctions.
Sanctions consist of two parts. First, a player’s defection invokes partner’s sever-
ence decision, forcing him to start new partnership with a stranger. Second, payoﬀ
level he expects with this stranger is less than what he expects in continued part-
nership with the current partner. We call this payoﬀ diﬀerence as trust capital with
the ongoing partner.
In the main text, we have identiﬁed two ways by which trust is generated; posi-
tive trust-building periods and exploitation by strategies with longer trust-building
periods.
There is an additional mechanism which creates trust if we allow matching prob-
ability to be less than one: Even if trust is established with new partner immediately,
with a positive probability player fails to ﬁnd a partner in the matching pool (i.e.,
player is “unemployed”). This is the logic which provides a work incentive in the
eﬀciency wage theory as the possibility of unemployment works as a disciplinary de-
vice (see, e.g., Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). For completeness of the paper we brieﬂy
26discuss how our model can be extended to derive c0-strategy as a symmetric NSD
when there is a positive unemployment probability.
Suppose, in the matching pool, only with probability 1−u ∈ (0,1) one can ﬁnd
a new partner and with probability u ∈ (0,1) he spends the next period without a
partner and receives payoﬀ of 0 (which may be larger or smaller than d). With this
possibility of “unemployment”, the average payoﬀ that cT-strategy player expects
to receive in the matching pool (but before he ﬁnds a partner) is:
v
0(cT;pT) = (1 − u)v(cT;pT),
where v(cT;pT) is now interepreted as “the average payoﬀ that cT expects to receive
when the new partnership is formed” (i.e., at the beginning of period 1 of the
partnership).
By the same logic as in Section 3, the Best Reply Condition is v0(cT;pT) ≤ vBR.
Clearly, if (5) is satisﬁed, the Best Reply condition is also satisﬁed. Moreover, it can
be satisﬁed even for c0 for suﬃciently large u, and cooperation without trust-building
period becomes a self-sustaining state.5
As noted in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and Okuno-Fujiwara (1989), unemploy-
ment works as a disciplinary device that deters moral hazard behavior. This obser-
vation suggests that the property of matching machanism is an important element
in creating trust. In our setup, there are four reasons to be in the matching pool:
new birth, death of the partner, separation due to the partner’s deviation, and sepa-
ration due to own deviation. In this paper we analyzed the case where no distinction
can be made among these due to the lack of information. We plan to extend our
research to investigate mechanisms with which players can distinguish at least some
reasons why newly matched partner came into the matching pool.
5.2. Alternating-Action Equilibrium
If 2c < g +`, then repeating (C,C) is not the most eﬃcient outcome. It is most
eﬃcient to alternate (C,D) and (D,C). By a similar logic to the monomorphic
5Carmichael and MacLeod (1997) use essentially the same logic by gift-giving instead of unem-
ployment.
27equilibrium, the following two-strategy distribution constitutes a NSD for suﬃciently
long trust-building periods.
DEFINITION. For any T = 1,2,..., aT-strategy is a simple strategy with the set of
acceptable paths
QaT = {(
T times z }| {
(D,D),···(D,D),(C,D),(D,C),...),
(
T times z }| {
(D,D),···(D,D),(C,C),(C,C),...)}.
DEFINITION. For any T = 1,2,..., bT-strategy is a simple strategy with the set of
acceptable paths
QbT = {(
T times z }| {
(D,D),···(D,D),(D,C),(C,D),...),
(
T times z }| {
(D,D),···(D,D),(D,D),(C,C),(C,C)...),}.
If aT met aT, the play path is the same as cT meeting cT. If aT met bT, the play
path after T periods of trust-building alternates action proﬁles (C,D) and (D,C).
If bT met bT, the play path is the same as cT+1 meeting cT+1.
Note that there is no voluntary separation on the play path even though there
are multiple strategies in the society. Therefore the essential logic is the same as that
of a monomorphic NSD. This type of equilibrium can be interpreted as a “single-
norm” equilibrium with coordinated action proﬁles. The analysis will be useful for
other types of component games of voluntarily separable games such as Hawk-Dove
game, where the eﬃcient outcome is a coordinated action proﬁle.
5.3. Cheap Talk
Recall that c1-strategy can invade the population of a ˜ d-strategy. We can inter-
pret that c1-strategy proposes to keep the partnership even after (D,D) and that
this proposal acts as a “signal” or “cheap talk” that it is not ˜ d-strategy and intends
to cooperate. This reminds us of papers like Robson (1990) and Matsui (1991) who
28showed that cheap talk can be used as a signal to play the Pareto eﬃcient Nash
equilibrium in coordination games. Because there are multiple NSD with diﬀerent
payoﬀ outcomes in our model, cheap talk may work as a coordination device to
achieve eﬃcient equilibrium in evolutionary setting. We provide a rough sketch of
what would happen if we allow cheap talk at the beginning of each match.
Assume that when two players are newly matched, they simultaneously choose
and send a message m ∈ M from a countable set M to the partner. M is common
to all players. The messages do not alter the payoﬀ and thus are cheap-talk. The
message choice is private information, shared between the partners but not known
by any other palyers.
DEFINITION. A pure strategy sCT of VSPD with cheap talk consists of (m,σ) such
that:
1. m ∈ M speciﬁes the message the player sends to any new partner,
2. σ : M → S speciﬁes the VSPD strategy σ(m0) the player chooses to play for
each message m0 ∈ M he receives from the partner.
Let S
CT be the set of all pure strategies of VSPD with cheap talk, which is the
extension of S deﬁned for the original VSPD without cheap talk.
We focus on two types of strategies; babbling strategy where message choice has
no meaningful contents and neologism strategy where the message can be anything
that is diﬀerent from the ones used by the incumbents.
DEFINITION. Given a strategy s ∈ S of VSPD, a strategy sB(s) = (m,σs) ∈ S
CT
of the cheap talk game is an associated babbling strategy of s if σs(m0) = s for all
m0 ∈ M.
Note that there is a class of associated babbling strategies of the same s ∈
S depending on the initial message m, but, if all players use associated babbling
strategies of the same s ∈ S, then the initial message does not matter. Thus we
can focus on σs. Similarly, given a strategy distribution p ∈ P(S), an associated
29babbling strategy distribution is denoted as σp ∈ P(S
CT). As is well-known, any
babbling extension of a Nash equilibrium of the ordinary VSPD is always a Nash
equilibrium of the cheap talk model because the initial message exchange does not
matter.
LEMMA 13. For any Nash Equilibrium p ∈ P(S) of VSPD, an associated babbling
strategy distribution σp ∈ P(S
CT) is a Nash Equilibrium of the cheap talk model.
PROOF: Obvious.
However, some babbling Nash equilibria are invaded by a neologism strategy
in the cheap talk model. Suppose that the current population consists of babbling
strategies of s ∈ S. Against the strategy distribution, consider an entrant population
who uses a strategy sN = (ζ,σN) ∈ S
CT such that
(a) it announces a neologism message ζ ∈ M, which is not used by the current
population,
(b) σN(m0) = s when m0 6= ζ, and
(c) σN(ζ) = s0 6= s.
With this neologism strategy, entrants play exactly the same way as incumbents
(i.e., play s) when they are matched with incumbents, while they play diﬀerently
(i.e., play according to s0) against fellow entrants. They can identify incumbents who
announce non-neologism messages from fellow entrants who announce neologism
message at the initial message exchange. Therefore, for example, if the incumbents
are playing associated babbling strategies of cT-strategy, entrants can play cT−1
among themselves and earn higher average payoﬀ than the incumbents. However, if
the trust-building periods are shortened more and more, eventually the Best Reply
Condition will be violated. Hence we require that entrants must be a best reply to
the post-entry distribution, to avoid the non-existence of a stable distribution.6
6This idea is the same as Swinkels (1992).
30DEFINITION. A stationary strategy distribution p in the matching pool is a Neutrally
Stable Distribution under Equilibrium Entrants (NSDEE) if, for any s0, there exists
¯ ² ∈ (0,1) such that, for any ² ∈ (0,¯ ²), s0 is a best reply to (1 − ²)p + ²ps0 and s0
cannot invade p for ².
Let s∗ ∈ S of VSPD be the most eﬃcient NSS (i.e., the average payoﬀ is the
highest among NSS). Let σs∗ ∈ P(SCT) be an associated babbling strategy distri-
bution. Clearly, with cheap talk, no strategy can invade the most eﬃcient NSS as
an equlibrium entrant. Thus, we have the following result.
PROPOSITION 6. Among associated babbling strategy distributions of monomorphic
NSDs, the most eﬃcient σs∗ ∈ P(SCT) is the unique NSDEE with cheap talk.
PROOF: Obvious.
5.4. Drift and Limit of Solution Concept
The concept of NSD is not suﬃciently restrictive in our model, because any
strategy distribution leaves many unreached nodes. Limitation of the concept of
NSD is especially evident in view of the possibility of drift. As an example, consider
the following thought experiment with or without cheap talk. Suppose G and δ are
chosen so that c1-strategy is the most eﬃcient NSS. Since c1 is NSDEE, once the
entire society starts to use c1 (or σB(c1) if cheap talk is allowed), no strategy can
invade as an equilibrium entrant.
However, there are numerous strategies which produce exactly the same outcome
(and hence the same average payoﬀ) but diﬀer in the behavior at unreached nodes.
For example, consider the following strategy ˆ c1 ∈ S:
t = 1 : play D and choose k regardless of the outcome,
t ≥ 2 : play C and choose k regardless of the outcome.
This strategy produces exactly the same outcome as p1 as long as the society
consists only of c1 and ˆ c1. Thus, strarting from p1, strategy distribution may drift to
any distribution γp1+(1−γ)ˆ p1 with γ ∈ [0,1], where ˆ p1 is the distribution consisting
only of ˆ c1.
31However, ˆ c1 being an extremely permissive strategy, strategies such as c∞ can
take advantage and materialize payoﬀ stream of (d,g,g,...) during the match with
ˆ c1. Note that c∞ can receive average payoﬀ of only d in the strategy distribution p1,
which is strictly lower than that of c1. However if drifts make γ suﬃciently large,
c∞ starts to drive out c1. Eventually, strategy distribution may become p∞, the
symmetric distribution consisting only of c∞.
Such a story suggests that we might consider set-theoretic solution concepts,
such as Equilibrium Evolutionary Stable Set of Swinkles (1992) or Socially Stable
Strategies of Matsui (1992). In fact, drifts may lead from p1 to ˆ p1, from ˆ p1 to p∞,
from p∞ to p˜ d, and from p˜ d back to p1. However, there are many other closed paths
which are connected by drifts (through equilibrium entrants). The cardinality of set
of stragies being so large, we shall not try to identify these sets in this paper.
5.5. Related Literature
Several papers have previously analyzed the voluntarily separable games, though
not as fully as this paper does. We discuss two main points of our paper in relation to
the literature: the function of trust-building periods and the meaning of polymorphic
equilibria.
First, the trust-building periods in our equilibria serve as a mechanism for sanc-
tion against defection because they make the initial value of a new partnership small.
In the literature, the gift exchange of Carmichael and MacLeod (1997) and the grad-
ual cooperation in Datta (1996) and Kranton (1996a) have the same function. By
contrast, the gradual cooperation under incomplete information (Ghosh and Ray,
1996, and Kranton, 1996a) is to sort types out and thus has a diﬀerent meaning.7
Our model is more primitive than these previous works: the game is of com-
plete information, the component game is an ordinary prisoner’s dilemma with two
actions, and there is no gift exchange prior to the partnership. We show that it
is still possible to construct a punishment mechanism. Furthermore, we consider
7The repeated games with quitting option (Watson, 2002, Blonski and Probst, 2001, and Furu-
sawa and Kawakami, 2004) also display gradual cooperation to sort types.
32evolution of behaviors within a society as a whole, rather than restricting attention
to behaviors within a single partneship given (symmetric) strategy distribution in
a society. We are also able to provide fuller characterizations of symmetric trust-
building strategy NSD, such as indentifying the condition (in terms of death rate
and payoﬀs of stage game) for the existence of NSD with a particular length of
trust-building periods and so on.
Second, the existence and higher eﬃciency of polymorphic equilibria than monomor-
phic equilibria is a totally new result. The logic that early start of long-term coop-
eration is sustained because of possible exploitation in a new partnership is similar
to the equilibrium of Rob and Yang (2005), written independently from our pa-
per. In their model, there are three types of players; bad type who always plays
D, good type who always plays C, and rationanl type who tries to maximize their
payoﬀ. Existence of bad type players makes it valuable to (1) keep and cooperate
with either good or rational type partners, and (2) to ﬁnd out bad type partners as
soon as possible. Thus, a rational player should cooperate from the beginning to be
distinguished from the bad-type.
Our result is much starker than Rob and Yang’s. Our model does not rely on
heterogeous “type” and incomplete information. Instead, bad (longer trust-buidling)
strategy emerges endogenously as a polymorphic NSD. We also show that there are
equilibria with more than two (even inﬁnitely many) heterogenous strategies.
APPENDIX: PROOFS
PROOF OF LEMMA 3:
(a) Let s0 be a strategy that chooses e in some t after on-path history. If t < T +1, the
average payoﬀ of s0 under pT is d and is strictly less than v(cT;pT) = (1−δ2T)d+δ2Tc.
If t ≥ T + 1, the average value is
L(s0,cT) =
1 − δ2t
1 − δ2 ,
V I(s0,cT) = (1 + δ2 + ··· + δ2(T−1))d + (δ2T + ··· + δ2(t−1))c,




1 − δ2 d +
δ2T(1 − δ2(t−T))




{v(cT;pT) − v(s0;pT)}(1 − δ2t)
= (1 − δ2t)(1 − δ2T)d − (1 − δ2T)d + (1 − δ2t)δ2Tc − δ2T(1 − δ2(t−T))c
= (1 − δ2T)δ2t(c − d) > 0.
(b) If one chooses C in t < T + 1 along on-path history, then the average payoﬀ is
less than d since the partnership ends there and hence is less than v(cT;pT) =
(1 − δ2T)d + δ2Tc.
(c) Although the text contains a proof with one-step deviation argument, we provide an
alternative proof using the average payoﬀ itself to conﬁrm that one-step deviation
method is necessary and suﬃcient. Let s be any strategy that chooses D at some
t ≥ T + 1 along on-path history.
L(s,cT) =
1 − δ2t
1 − δ2 ,





1 − δ2 d +
δ2T(1 − δ2(t−T−1))




{v(cT;pT) − v(s;pT)}(1 − δ2t)
= (1 − δ2t)(1 − δ2T)d + (1 − δ2t)δ2Tc
−(1 − δ2T)d − (δ2T − δ2(t−1))c − (1 − δ2)δ2(t−1)g,
= −δ2t(1 − δ2T)d + δ2(t−1)(1 − δ2T+2)c − (1 − δ2)δ2(t−1)g,
= δ2(t−1)
h





δ2(1 − δ2T)(c − d) − (1 − δ2)(g − c)
i
.
Therefore v(cT;pT) − v(s;pT) ≥ 0 if and only if δ2 1−δ2T
1−δ2 (c − d) ≥ g − c. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF LEMMA 4: Let q := (1 − ²)p + ²ps0. From (1), for any s ∈ supp(p),










































34By letting ² → 0, we obtain
v(s0;p) ≥ v(s;p),
for any s ∈ supp(p). Since p is a Nash equilibrium, we have that s0 ∈ BR(p). Q.E.D.
PROOF OF LEMMA 5: Let us rearrange v(cT;pT+1




αL(cT,cT)vI(cT,cT) + (1 − α)L(cT,cT+1)vI(cT,cT+1)
αL(cT,cT) + (1 − α)L(cT,cT+1)
=
αL(cT,cT)vI(cT,cT)
αL(cT,cT) + (1 − α)L(cT,cT+1)
+
(1 − α)L(cT,cT+1)vI(cT,cT+1)
αL(cT,cT) + (1 − α)L(cT,cT+1)
=
αL(cT,cT)

















L(cT,cT+1) + α{L(cT,cT) − L(cT,cT+1)}
.
This is the only part that α is involved in v(cT;pT+1
T (α)). We can simplfy as
v(cT;pT+1
T (α)) = vI(cT,cT+1) + µ(cT,pT+1







[L(cT,cT+1) + α{L(cT,cT) − L(cT,cT+1)}]2 > 0,
and, since L(cT,cT) − L(cT,cT+1) = 1
1−δ2 − 1−δ2(T+1)
1−δ2 > 0, the derivative is decreasing in
α. Note also that
vI(cT,cT) − vI(cT,cT+1)
= (1 − δ2T)d + δ2Tc −
(1 − δ2T)d + δ2T(1 − δ2)`
1 − δ2(T+1)
=
(1 − δ2T){1 − δ2(T+1) − 1}d + δ2T{(1 − δ2(T+1))c − (1 − δ2)`}
1 − δ2(T+1)
=
δ2T{(1 − δ2)(c − `) + δ2(1 − δ2T)(c − d)}
1 − δ2(T+1) > 0.
Hence v(cT,pT+1
T (α)) is strictly increasing and concave in α. Q.E.D




αL(cT+1,cT)vI(cT+1,cT) + (1 − α)L(cT+1,cT+1)vI(cT+1,cT+1)














T (α)) = vI(cT+1,cT+1) + µ(cT+1,pT+1




= {vI(cT+1,cT) − vI(cT,cT)} + {vI(cT,cT) − vI(cT+1,cT+1)} > 0,
since T ≤ τ(δ) (thus the ﬁrst bracket is nonnegative) and cT starts cooperation earlier







[L(cT+1,cT+1) + α{L(cT+1,cT) − L(cT+1,cT+1)}]2 > 0.
However, notice that L(cT+1,cT) − L(cT+1,cT+1) = 1−δ2(T+1)
1−δ2 − 1
1−δ2 < 0 so that the
derivative is increasing in α. Therefore v(cT+1;pT+1
T (α)) is strictly increasing but convex
in α. Q.E.D
PROOF OF LEMMA 7: Let µT(α) =
αL(cT,cT)
L(cT;pT+1





T (α)) = µT(α)vI(cT,cT) + {1 − µT(α)}vI(cT,cT+1),
v(cT+1;pT+1
















[αL(cT,cT) + (1 − α)L(cT,cT+1))]2 →
L(cT,cT+1))
L(cT,cT)














At δ = δ(T),
v(cT;pT+1
T (1)) = vI(cT,cT) = v(cT+1;pT+1
T (1)) = vI(cT+1,cT).






















= (1 − δ2(T+1))
δ2T(1 − δ2)(g − `)
1 − δ2(T+1) −
1
1 − δ2(T+1)δ2T(1 − δ2)(c − d)
= δ2T(1 − δ2)
n






PROOF OF LEMMA 9: We consider the continuation average values of the incumbent
strategies (cT and cT+1) and one-step deviant strategies. It suﬃces to check two kinds of
one-step deviations during the cooperation periods of either cT or cT+1. (Note that unlike
the monomorphic case, you cannot guarantee to get g at T + 1 by playing D. Therefore
we cannot use the computation in the monomorphic case directly.)
1. Imitate cT in the ﬁrst T periods. For t ≥ T + 1, play D and keep the partnership
regardless of the outcome, until your partner ends the partnership.
Using the continuation values, this type of deviation is not better than cT+1-strategy
if and only if
α{g + δV (cT;pT+1
T (α))}
+(1 − α){d + δ(1 − δ)V (cT;pT+1
T (α)) + δ2g + δ3V (cT;pT+1
T (α))}
≤ α{g + δV (cT;pT+1
T (α))} + (1 − α){d +
δ(1 − δ)





T (α)) = (1 − δ)V (cT;pT+1
T (α)) ≤
c − (1 − δ2)g
δ2 = vBR
2. Imitate cT in the ﬁrst T periods. For t = T + 1, play C and keep the partnership
regardless of the outcome. At t = T +2, play D and keep the partnership regardless
of the outcome. Denote a strategy in this class by sT.
This type of deviation is not better than cT-strategy if and only if
α{c + δ(1 − δ)V (cT;pT+1
T (α)) + δ2g + δ3V (cT;pT+1
T (α))}




1 − δ2 +
δ(1 − δ)
1 − δ2 V (cT;pT+1
T (α))} + (1 − α){` + δV (cT;pT+1
T (α))}
⇐⇒ v(cT;pT+1
T (α)) = (1 − δ)V (cT;pT+1
T (α)) ≤
c − (1 − δ2)g
δ2 = vBR.
Q.E.D.
37PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: We prove some useful lemmas ﬁrst. For any T,T0 ∈ N,
deﬁne
Γ(cT,cT0) := L(cT,cT0){vI(cT,cT0) − vBR}.
Then the following lemma is immediate.
LEMMA 14. For any T,T0 ∈ N, if T,T0 ≥ 1, then:
Γ(cT,cT0) = d − vBR + δ2Γ(cT−1,cT0−1). (18)
Proof of Lemma 14: By deﬁnitions of Γ, L and V I:
Γ(cT,cT0) = L(cT,cT0)vI(cT,cT0) − L(cT,cT0)vBR
= V I(cT,cT0) − L(cT,cT0)vBR
= d + δ2V I(cT−1,cT0−1) − {1 + δ2L(cT−1,cT0−1)}vBR
= d − vBR + δ2Γ(cT−1,cT0−1).
LEMMA 15. For any T ∈ N and for any v ∈ R:
L(cT+1,cT){vI(cT+1,cT) − v} R L(cT,cT){vI(cT,cT) − v} ⇐⇒ v R vBR. (19)








1 − δ2 − g.
Hence we have that
[L(c0,c0) − L(c1,c0)]vBR = L(c0,c0)vI(c0,c0) − vI(c1,c0)L(c1,c0).
It can be rewritten as
L(c1,c0){vI(c1,c0) − vBR} = L(c0,c0){vI(c0,c0) − vBR}.
Because L(c1,c0) = 1 < L(c0,c0) = 1
1−δ2,
L(c1,c0){vI(c1,c0) − v} R L(c0,c0){vI(c0,c0) − v} ⇐⇒ v R vBR,
and the assertion holds when T = 0.
Next suppose that the assertion holds for T −1. We rewrite LHS inequalities for T as
L(cT+1,cT){vI(cT+1,cT) − v} R L(cT,cT){vI(cT,cT) − v},
⇐⇒ L(cT+1,cT){vI(cT+1,cT) − vBR − (v − vBR)}
R L(cT,cT){vI(cT,cT) − vBR − (v − vBR)},
⇐⇒ Γ(cT+1,cT) − L(cT+1,cT){v − vBR} R Γ(cT,cT) − L(cT,cT){v − vBR}.
By Lemma 14,
⇐⇒ d − vBR + δ2Γ(cT,cT−1) − {1 + δ2L(cT,cT−1)}{v − vBR}
R d − vBR + δ2Γ(cT−1,cT−1) − {1 + δ2L(cT−1,cT−1)}{v − vBR}
⇐⇒ L(cT,cT−1){vI(cT,cT−1) − v} R L(cT−1,cT−1){vI(cT−1,cT−1) − v},
and the last inequalities hold by the induction assumption.
38COROLLARY 1. For any T,T0 ∈ N,
Γ(cT,cT) = Γ(cT+1,cT).
COROLLARY 2. vI(cT+1,cT) − vI(cT,cT) is strictly decreasing in T.
Proof of Corollary 2: In view of Corollary 1,














= [vI(cT+1,cT) − vBR]
L(cT,cT) − L(cT+1,cT)
L(cT,cT)
= [vI(cT+1,cT) − vBR]δ2(T+1),
which is strictly decreasing in T.
Because of the concavity of v(cT;pT+1
T (α)) and convexity of v(cT+1;pT+1
T (α)), thanks
to Corollary 2 and continuity of average values with respect to T, the next lemma is
immediate. (See Figure 3.)
LEMMA 16. For any δ > δ∗, there exists 0 ≤ τ2(δ) < τ(δ) such that, if τ2(δ) < T < τ(δ),
(a) there exist αT+1
T (δ) ∈ (0,1) and αT+1
T (δ) ∈ (0,1) with αT+1
T (δ) < αT+1
T (δ),
(b) v(cT;pT+1
T (α)) > v(cT+1;pT+1
T (α)) ⇔ α ∈ (αT+1
T (δ),αT+1
T (δ)).
Therefore, for suﬃciently large T such that τ2(δ) < T < τ(δ), there is a unique payoﬀ-
equalizing αT+1
T (δ). Let α∗
T(vBR) and α∗
T+1(vBR) be the fractions of cT-strategy which
solve v(cT;pT+1
T (α)) = vBR and v(cT+1;pT+1
T (α)) = vBR respectively. To show that the
Best Reply Condition is satisﬁed at αT+1








































39Corollary 1 implies that
{α∗
T(vBR) − α∗
T+1(vBR)}{Γ(cT,cT) − Γ(cT,cT+1)}{Γ(cT,cT) − Γ(cT+1,cT+1)}
= Γ(cT,cT){Γ(cT+1,cT+1) − Γ(cT,cT+1)}.










1 − δ2 d + δ2T` −
1 − δ2(T+1)






= δ2T(1 − δ2)(d − `) + δ2(T+1)(c − vBR) = δ2T(1 − δ2)(d − ` + g − c) > 0.
Therefore the Best Reply Condition is satisﬁed. Q.E.D.






T+1(vBR)L(cT+1,cT)vI(cT+1,cT) + {1 − α∗
T+1(vBR)}L(cT+1,cT+1)vI(cT+1,cT+1)
= α∗
T+1(vBR)L(cT+1,cT)vBR + {1 − α∗
T+1(vBR)}L(cT+1,cT+1)vBR,
⇐⇒ α∗












Next, we prove that for any α < α∗
T+1(vBR),
v(cT+1;pT+2
T (α,β∗(α))) < v(cT+1;pT+1
T (α)).




T (α)) − v}
= αΓ(cT+1,cT) + (1 − α)Γ(cT+1,cT+1)




T (α,β∗(α))) − v}
= αΓ(cT+1,cT) + (1 − α){β∗(α)Γ(cT+1,cT+1) + (1 − β∗(α))Γ(cT+1,cT+2)
+[αL(cT+1,cT) + (1 − α){β∗(α)L(cT+1,cT+1)





= (1 − α)(1 − β∗(α))[{Γ(cT+1,cT+1) − Γ(cT+1,cT+2)}
+{L(cT+1,cT+1) − L(cT+1,cT+2)}(vBR − v)].
By computation
{Γ(cT+1,cT+1) − Γ(cT+1,cT+2)}(1 − δ2) = δ2(T+1){δ2(c − vBR) + (1 − δ2)(c − `)} > 0.
Hence, Φ∗
T+1(α,v) > Φ∗∗
T+1(α,v) if v ≤ vBR. Now,
L(cT+1;pT+2
T (α,β∗(α))[{v(cT+1;pT+1
T (α)) − v} − {v(cT+1;pT+2




−(1 − α)(1 − β∗(α)){L(cT+1,cT+1) − L(cT+1,cT+2)}{v(cT+1;pT+1
T (α)) − v}.
Let v = v(cT+1;pT+1
T (α)), then the above implies that
v(cT+1;pT+2
T (α,β∗(α))) < v(cT+1;pT+1
T (α))
if v(cT+1;pT+1
T (α)) < vBR. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF LEMMA 11: Consider ct-strategy for an arbitrary t ∈ {T,T +1,T +2,...} and
the beginning of period t+1 in a match, when ct-strategy is about to start cooperation. Let
αt be the conditional probability that the partner is the same strategy. The conditional
probability is 1−αt that the partner has a longer trust-building period. The (non-averaged)
continuation payoﬀ of ct-strategy at the beginning of t + 1 is
V (ct;p,t + 1) = αt{
c
1 − δ2 +
δ(1 − δ)
1 − δ2 V (ct;p)} + (1 − αt){` + δV (ct;p)}. (20)
On the other hand, the continuation payoﬀ of ct+1-strategy is
V (ct+1;p,t + 1) = αt{g + δV (ct+1;p)}
+(1 − αt){d + δ(1 − δ)V (ct+1;p) + δ2V (ct+1;p,t + 2)}. (21)
Notice that the payoﬀ structure for ct+1-strategy at the beginning of period t+2 when
it just ﬁnished the trust building is the same as that of ct-strategy at t + 1, i.e.,
V (ct+1;p,t + 2) = V (ct;p,t + 1).
Therefore (21) becomes
V (ct+1;p,t + 1) = αt{g + δV (ct+1;p)}
+(1 − αt){d + δ(1 − δ)V (ct+1;p) + δ2V (ct;p,t + 1)}
⇐⇒ V (ct+1;p,t + 1) =
1
1 − (1 − αt)δ2
£
αt{g + δV (ct+1;p)}
+(1 − αt){d + δ(1 − δ)V (ct+1;p)}
¤
. (22)
From the assumption that the average payoﬀs of ct and ct+1 are the same,
V (ct;p) = V (ct+1;p). (23)
41Then, since the payoﬀ until t is the same for both ct and ct+1, we also have
V (ct;p,t + 1) = V (ct+1;p,t + 1). (24)
(24) implies that the RHS of (20) and (22) must be the same. Using (23) and letting
V ∗(p) = V (ct;p) = V (ct+1;p), αt must satisfy
αt{
c
1 − δ2 +
δ(1 − δ)
1 − δ2 V ∗(p)} + (1 − αt){` + δV ∗(p)}
=
αt{g + δV ∗(p)} + (1 − αt){d + δ(1 − δ)V ∗(p)}
1 − (1 − αt)δ2 .
Since this equation does not depend on t, we have established that αt = α for all t =
T,T + 1,..., i.e., the fraction of cT+τ-strategy is of the form α(1 − α)τ. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF LEMMA 12: For any strategy pair (s,s0) and any stationary distribution p
in the matching pool, let V (s,s0;p) be the (non-averaged) payoﬀ of strategy s when it is
newly matched with s0, i.e.,
V (s,s0;p) = V I(s,s0) + {1 − (1 − δ)L(s,s0)}V (s;p),
where the ﬁrst term of the RHS is the in-match payoﬀ and the second term is the expected
payoﬀ when s-strategy looses the partner either by the death or because they reached
the ending date T(s,s0). (See Section 2.3.) Then the long-run payoﬀ of cT-strategy is
decomposed as
V (cT;p∞
T (α)) = αV (cT,cT;p∞
T (α))
+(1 − α)V (cT,cT+1;p∞
T (α)). (25)
The long-run payoﬀ of cT+1-strategy is decomposed as
V (cT+1;p∞
T (α)) = αV (cT+1,cT;p∞
T (α))
+(1 − α)[α{d + δ2V (cT,cT;p∞
T (α)) + δ(1 − δ)V (cT+1;p∞
T (α))}
(1 − α){d + δ2V (cT,cT+1;p∞




+(1 − α)[d + δ2V (cT;p∞
T (α)) + δ(1 − δ)V (cT+1;p∞
T (α))], (26)
where the last equality uses (25). The intuition is easily understood from Table II(b). The
equality (26) is equivalent to
[1 − (1 − α)δ(1 − δ)]V (cT+1;p∞
T (α)) = αV (cT+1,cT;p∞
T (α)) + (1 − α)d
+(1 − α)δ2V (cT;p∞
T (α)). (27)
Similarly from Table II(b) and II(c),
V (cT+2;p∞
T (α)) = αV (cT+2,cT;p∞
T (α))
(1 − α)[d + δ2V (cT+1;p∞
T (α)) + δ(1 − δ)V (cT+2;p∞
T (α))].
42TABLE II
(a): Payoﬀ sequence of cT-strategy under p∞
T (α) within a match
prob. partner \ time 1 2 ··· T T + 1 T + 2 T + 3 T + 4
α cT d d ··· d c c c ···
(1 − α) cT+1 and up d d ··· d `
(b): Payoﬀ sequence of cT+1-strategy under p∞
T (α) within a match
prob. partner \ time 1 2 ··· T T + 1 T + 2 T + 3 T + 4
α cT d d ··· d g
(1 − α)α cT+1 d d ··· d d c c ···
(1 − α)2 cT+2 and up d d ··· d d `
(c) : Payoﬀ sequence of cT+2-strategy under p∞
T (α) within a match
prob. partner \ time 1 2 ··· T T + 1 T + 2 T + 3 T + 4
α cT d d ··· d g
(1 − α)α cT+1 d d ··· d d g
(1 − α)2α cT+2 d d ··· d d d c ···
(1 − α)3 cT+3 and up d d ··· d d d `
Note that cT+1 and cT+2 earn the same payoﬀ against cT and thus V (cT+2,cT;p∞
T (α)) =
V (cT+1,cT;p∞
T (α)). Therefore the long-run payoﬀ of cT+2-strategy solves
V (cT+2;p∞
T (α)) = αV (cT+1,cT;p∞
T (α))
+(1 − α)[[d + δ2V (cT+1;p∞
T (α)) + δ(1 − δ)V (cT+2;p∞
T (α))].
This is equivalent to
[1 − (1 − α)δ(1 − δ)]V (cT+2;p∞
T (α)) = αV (cT+1,cT;p∞
T (α)) + (1 − α)d
+(1 − α)δ2V (cT+1;p∞
T (α)). (28)
If V (cT;p∞
T (α)) = V (cT+1;p∞
T (α)), then the last term of the right hand sides of (27)
and (28) are the same and therefore
V (cT+1;p∞
T (α)) = V (cT+2;p∞
T (α)).
We can continue this argument for any t > T. Q.E.D.




T (α)) − v}
= αΓ(cT+1,cT) + (1 − α)αΓ(cT+1,cT+1) + (1 − α)2Γ(cT+1,cT+2)





= (1 − α)2[Γ(cT+1,cT+1) − Γ(cT+1,cT+2)
+{L(cT+1,cT+1) − L(cT+1,cT+2)}(vBR − v) > 0,
if v ≤ vBR. Now,
L(cT+1;pT+2
T (α,β∗(α))[{v(cT+1;pT+1
T (α)) − v} − {v(cT+1;p∞




−(1 − α)2{L(cT+1,cT+1) − L(cT+1,cT+2)}{v(cT+1;pT+1
T (α)) − v}.
Let v = v(cT+1;pT+1
T (α)), then the above implies that
v(cT+1;p∞
T (α,β∗(α))) < v(cT+1;pT+1
T (α))
if v(cT+1;pT+1
T (α)) < vBR. Hence if v(cT+1;pT+1
T (α)) intersects with v(cT;pT+1
T (α)) below
vBR, then so does v(cT+1;p∞
T (α)). Q.E.D.
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